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Abstract
We develop an overlapping generations model with environmental
quality and endogenous environmental culture. Based upon empirical
evidence, preferences over culturally-weighted consumption and envi-
ronmental quality are assumed to follow a Leontieff function. We find
that four different regimes may be possible, with interior or corner
solutions in investments in environmental culture and maintenance.
Depending on the parameter conditions, there exists one of two pos-
sible, asymptotically stable steady states, one with and one without
investments in environmental culture.
For low wealth levels, society is unable to free resources for envi-
ronmental culture. In this case, society will only invest in environ-
mental maintenance if environmental quality is sufficiently low. Once
society has reached a certain level of economic development, then it
may optimally invest a part of its wealth in developing an environ-
mental culture. Environmental culture has not only a positive im-
pact on environmental quality through lower levels of consumption,
but it improves the environment through maintenance expenditure
for wealth-environment combinations at which, in a restricted model
without environmental culture, no maintenance would be undertaken.
Environmental culture leads to a society with a higher indirect utility
at steady state in comparison to the restricted model.
Our model leads us to the conclusion that, by raising the impor-
tance of environmental quality for utility, environmental culture leads
to lower steady state levels of consumption and wealth, but higher
environmental quality. Thus, for societies trapped in a situation with
low environmental quality, investments in culture may induce posi-
tive feedback loops, where more culture raises environmental quality
which in turn raises environmental culture. We also discuss how en-
vironmental culture may lead to an Environmental Kuznets Curve.
Keywords: environmental culture; overlapping generations model; en-
vironment; endogenous preferences.
JEL classification: Q56; D90.
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1 Introduction
The environmental economics literature has extensively studied the role of
consumption and abatement decisions for the interplay between economic
growth and environmental quality. The focus of this literature has mostly
been on the role of technical change, the limits to economic growth (Stokey
1998) imposed by resource constraints (Solow 1974, Dasgupta and Heal 1974),
the usefulness of taxes (Jaffe et al. 2003) or educational measures (Prieur and
Bre´chet 2013). However, in studying these aspects, the literature has barely
taken into account cultural aspects (Throsby 2000). Culture plays the impor-
tant role of shaping the way in which our preferences are directed towards the
environment. Specifically, Linton (1963, p.466) defines culture as being “the
sum total of the knowledge, attitudes and habitual behavior patterns shared
and transmitted by the members of a particular society.” Consequently, it
also affects how we trade off considerations of economic growth and envi-
ronmental quality. As a result, culture is not a static concept but develops
endogenously. We focus here on the type of culture that affects society’s
attitude towards the consumption-environment trade-off. We dub this par-
ticular type of culture the ‘environmental culture’. With the specific topic
of environmental culture in mind, we have witnessed remarkable changes in
attitudes towards the environment during the past few years. To understand
how precisely these changes in attitude affect the consumption-environment
trade-off, and the drivers of the social changes, we here study the interplay
between environmental culture, economic decisions and the environment.
The first extension in this article is that environmental culture is endoge-
nously determined by the agent. The modeling approach shares ideas from
Rapoport and Vidal (2007) and John and Pecchenino (1994). In this frame-
work, culture affects the how society values consumption when young relative
to environmental quality when old. Examples for this are educational mea-
sures1, the time spent on learning to appreciate the environment, or a social
1For early empirical evidence see Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) or, more recently,
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norm directed towards sustainability. Since these do not come for free, the
model is based on the assumption that the choice of culture is costly. We
discuss this more closely in section 2.
The second extension is that the agents’ preferences are described by a
Leontieff function. This implies that environmental quality and consumption
are perfect complements and thus decisions follow a lexiographical order. It
allows to place a stronger emphasis on the fact that, firstly, there is only a
very limited trade-off between consumption and environment possible. This
assumption is akin to the strong sustainability paradigm (see e.g. Daly 1992).
Secondly, it suggests that agents place absolute priority on the factor of utility
that is most needed. We discuss this further in section 2. Environmental
culture is then modeled as a sort of mediator between the two, meaning
that it acts as a weight on the relative valuation of consumption and the
environment. Thus, in a materialistic society, environmental culture is likely
to bear little influence and a unit of consumption is valued more highly than
environmental quality. In contrast, an ecocentric society is characterized by
a high level of environmental culture and environmental quality will receive
a much higher weight in utility.
The results of this paper are as follows. For low wealth levels, society
is unable to free resources for environmental culture. In this case, society
will only invest in environmental maintenance if environmental quality is
sufficiently low. Once society has reached a certain level of economic de-
velopment, then it may optimally invest a part of its wealth in developing
an environmental culture. When environmental quality and wealth are both
sufficiently large, then society may find it optimal to temporarily over-invest
in environmental culture. This is optimal until environmental quality is de-
creased to a level from which onwards it is important for society to also
invest in maintenance. In other words, if there is no urgent need for society
to improve environmental quality, then society will either invest in environ-
Franzen and Meyer (2010).
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mental culture if it can afford to do so, or not invest in case it is too poor.
Then, since investments in environmental culture raise the importance of en-
vironmental quality for utility, it becomes also more worthwhile for society to
spend money on maintenance due to a positive feedback between culture and
the environment. As a result, environmental culture has not only a positive
impact on environmental quality through lower levels of consumption, but
in addition it improves the environment through maintenance expenditure
for wealth-environment combinations at which, in a restricted model without
environmental culture, no maintenance would be undertaken. Technological
improvements in emission or abatement efficiency both raise steady state
wealth and environmental quality.
Our model leads us to the conclusion that by raising the importance of
environmental quality for utility, environmental culture leads to lower steady
state levels of consumption and wealth, but a higher environmental qual-
ity. Furthermore, indirect utility at steady state is higher when societies
may invest in environmental culture. Basically, environmental culture not
only helps to further appreciate environmental quality, but in addition it re-
duces consumption and thereby increases environmental quality. Thus, for
sufficiently rich societies that are trapped in a steady state with low envi-
ronmental quality, investments in environmental culture may induce positive
feedback loops, where a higher appreciation of environmental quality due to
environmental culture also induces society to improve environmental quality,
which again drives increases in environmental culture.
The approach presented in this paper is closely related to the literature on
endogenous preferences as well as social norms.2 However, while a majority
of the articles in this line of literature studies predetermined preferences, we
develop a model of fully endogenous preferences.3 The article, furthermore,
2See e.g. Bowles (1998) for a general discussion. Other research includes e.g. endoge-
nous discounting (Becker and Mulligan 1997, Schumacher 2009b), endogenous preferences
from religious or group characteristics (Escriche et al. 2004), evolutionary selection or cul-
tural traits (Bisin and Verdier 1998, Bisin and Verdier 2001, Hauk and Saez-Marti 2002).
3Predetermined preferences means that, although preferences are endogenously deter-
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adds to the line of literature on cultural economics (Throsby 2000, Bowles
1998). Specifically, we here combine the major types of capital, namely
physical capital, natural capital and cultural capital in one model.4 Our
contribution is to study the endogenous formation of an environmental cul-
tural capital. We think about this as an intangible form of capital, which
defines the common ideas, beliefs and social norms and values of society. In
this respect, there is not the usual environmental economics trade-off, where
more physical capital may be substituted for less natural capital in produc-
tion. In our model, environmental culture affects the relative valuation of
environmental quality versus consumption, and thus physical capital.
The article is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss more about
the need to model environmental culture and why the choice of lexiographical
preferences is useful in this setting. Section 3 introduces the model, section
3.1 solves the temporal equilibrium, and in section 3.2 we solve an explicit
version that allows us to derive the global dynamics for the intertemporal
equilibrium. In section 4 we discuss several potential concerns of robustness.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Motivation
In this section we introduce the reader to the concept of an environmental
culture, and also discuss more fully our reasons for relying on lexiographical
preferences in the model that we introduce below.
2.1 Environmental culture
The antrophologist Linton describes culture as ”the sum total of the knowl-
edge, attitudes and habitual behavior patterns shared and transmitted by
mined in the model, society cannot choose its preferences itself.
4For simplicity we neglect from human capital, see Becker (2009). This could be a
worthwhile extension for future work.
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the members of a particular society... Cultures are adaptive mechanisms
and as such represent a response to the needs of our species” (Linton 1963,
p.466). Another known definition is given in Altman and Chemers (1980),
who describe culture as consisting of “... beliefs and perceptions, values and
norms, customs and behaviors of a group or society.” Similar definitions
by other antrophologists can be found in Tylor (1958) or Geertz (1957). In
economics, culture has been most strongly associated with institutions (e.g.
La Porta et al. 1997, Bowles 1998, Platteau 2000), social capital (Putnam
and Leonardi 1993) and norms (Bisin and Verdier 2005). Through these, cul-
ture has significant potential to affect the environment. It thus goes without
saying that culture plays a predominent role in shaping how we view, value
and subsequently treat trade-offs that affect the environment. We call the
specific type of culture that is associated with how mankind treats the planet
earth the environmental culture.
One question is really what shapes an environmental culture. In general,
the development of an environmental culture may arise in response to both
the desire to orient oneself closer to nature, or due to the need to do so.
Several articles have studied aspects of an environmental culture and how
these affect the relationship between wealth, resource exploitation and the
environment. Specifically, Sethi and Somanathan (1996) investigate endoge-
nous social norms in a local common-property resource game. They find
that two possible Nash-game equilibria may be stable, one being composed
of an individualistic society, the other of a norm-guided society. Brekke et
al. (2003) find, in a public good model with social norms directed to effort,
that, despite allowing for social norms, this still leads to an underprovision
of the public good. Nyborg et al. (2006) add replicator dynamics to the
model of Brekke et al. (2003). This results in an equilibrium where either
everyone acts according to the green norm, or everyone acts brown. Their
social norm rests on the assumption that the moral motivation to act green
is large if sufficiently many people act green, whereas the moral motivation
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is small otherwise. In contrast, Schumacher (2009a) assumes that more peo-
ple turn environmentalists, or adopt a green culture, when pollution is high,
while preferences get directed less towards the environment when pollution
is low. The common thread in these articles is that the level of the envi-
ronmental culture is a direct response to social needs. These responses, and
consequently the changes to the social norms, are assumed to be costless.
Nevertheless, there exists ample evidence suggesting that an environmental
culture develops in response to educational measures, pressure groups, or
simply through spending more time in nature itself.
In this article we are assuming that the development of an environmen-
tal culture is costly. One way through which an environmental culture may
be developed is through educational measures. Already in 1977, the UN-
ESCO/UNEP held a conference on the need for environmental education,
which resulted in the Tbilisi Declaration. In this document, it was suggested
that (p. 13-14) “...adopting a holistic approach, rooted in a broad inter-
disciplinary base, [environmental education] recreates an overall perspective
which acknowledges the fact that natural environment and man-made envi-
ronment are profoundly interdependent.” Furthermore, emphasis was placed
on the point that environmental education should (p. 14) “... encourage
those ethical, economic and esthetic values which, constituting the basis of
self-discipline, will further the development of conduct and improvement of
the environment.”
For example, a consumption-oriented, materialistic society concerns itself
very little with the effect of economic decisions on the environment. Instead,
it places consumption in the forefront of decisions and neglects externali-
ties imposed on the environment. In contrast, an ecocentric society is one
that has a more holistic approach and incorporates environmental considera-
tions into the decision-taking process. Consequently, the Tbilisi Declaration
thrives in making society more ecocentric, by increasing the emphasis that
society places on environmental issues relative to materialistic, consumption-
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oriented ones. In order to achieve this, several objectives were defined, as
summarized in Hungerford and Volk (1990). These are the building of aware-
ness, sensitivity, attitudes, skills and participation. One of the main variables
identified in that article and the meta-study covering 128 articles of Hines et
al. (1987) as being a decisive, prerequisite component in an environmental
behavior model is environmental sensitivity.
We here assume that the expenditure necessary to achieve a level of en-
vironmental culture Xt+1 is given by xt > 0. Function ψ(xt) > 0, ψ
′(xt) > 0
then transforms one unit of expenditure xt into ψ(xt) units of environmental
culture. We can then denote the equation that describes the evolution of
environmental culture by
Xt+1 = ψ(xt).
What we suggest here is that environmental culture depreciates fully during
the course of one generation. Specifically, this rests on the assumption that a
new generation does not ‘inherit’ any environmental culture from the previ-
ous one, and all educational measures or transfers of educational culture are
costly. This assumption makes sense if one believes that environmental cul-
ture is not freely adopted through a parent-child relationship5, but, instead,
is learned through costly educational measures that shape individuals’ atti-
tudes, skills and participation. However, these costs may also arise through
outdoor learning via e.g. field trips, through information provision (e.g. eco-
labels), or social norms that induce inefficiencies which we, for simplicity,
denote in monetary terms.
5There is, nevertheless, also evidence for an intergenerational transmission of pref-
erences, see e.g. Bisin and Verdier (2005) or Schumacher (2009a) in an environmental
economics setting. We discuss the implication of a costless intergenerational transmission
of an environmental culture in section 4.1.1.
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2.2 Preference structure
In general, economists assume that society can trade off consumption and
environmental quality in their utility function along a smooth isoquant. This
implies that, for example, society may stay on the same utility isoquant if
it gives up a little environmental quality to gain a little more of consump-
tion. Nevertheless, this trade-off very often does not, or cannot, happen.
One reason for this is that society allocates resources or chooses according
to a hierarchy of needs.6 In economics, this hierarchy of needs can be mod-
eled through lexiographical preferences. As a consequence, consumption and
environmental quality in the utility can not be easily substituted (Georgescu-
Roegen 1954).7
In terms of empirical evidence, Diekmann and Franzen (1999) have shown
that poorer societies rank environmental problems lower in comparison to
other problems, while they view the severity of these problems similarly to
rich societies. Consequently, societies may rank social decisions according to
their needs, and address them mostly consecutively. A poor country may,
therefore, place a stronger emphasis on consumption during its development
stage, while a sufficiently rich country may have enough financial resources
left over to treat the more pressing environmental problems. Only those
societies that are at the same time sufficiently rich and have a satisfactory
level of environmental quality may actually be able to trade off the two in
the conventional sense of economic trade-offs. Other empirical studies have
shown that around a quarter of individuals apply lexicographical preferences
6This has been suggested by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
7This assumption on the utility function is also an intermediate position to the debate
on strong versus weak sustainability. Brekke (1997) suggests that “[a] development is
... said to be weakly sustainable if the development is non-diminishing from generation
to generation.” In contrast, strong sustainability requires that both human and natural
capital are kept intact (Brekke et al. 1997, Daly 1992). While strong sustainability is a
requirement that is nearly impossible to be met for a developing society, weak sustain-
ability may induce unsustainable levels of environmental quality. Instead, lexiographical
preferences place attention on the input to utility that society ranks as being most crucial.
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when it comes to wildlife preservation (Stevens et al. 1991) or to wetland
preservation (Spash 2000).
We, thus, start off by assuming that society allocates resources based on a
lexiographical utility function that takes the form U = min{c, E}, where c is
consumption and E environmental quality. However, a unit of consumption
is generally not valued in the same way as a unit of environmental qual-
ity. In effect, as we argued above, the predominent environmental culture
at the time of the decision-taking may strongly affect the relative valuation
of consumption and environmental quality. This point is closely related to
the arguments in Lockwood (1996), Gowdy (1997) or Spash (2000). Conse-
quently, we take it that environmental culture affects the relative valuation
of consumption versus environmental quality by assuming it to be a multi-
plicative factor for consumption. We, thus, obtain
min{X(x)c, E}
As a result, the function min{X(0)c, E} is the basic preference of a society
in which no expenditure towards an environmental culture is undertaken. A
unit of environmental quality would then be worth X(0) units of consump-
tion. Thus, if X(x) is sufficiently low, e.g. tending to zero, then consumption
would obtain absolute priority over environmental quality, as long as the en-
vironment is not destroyed (i.e. goes to zero). The larger is X(x), the more
important becomes environmental quality to society. For example, assume
X(0) = 0.2. In this case, five units of consumption are effectively viewed
equivalent to one unit of environmental quality. This, thus, can be inter-
preted as a consumption-oriented society. An agent faced with high environ-
mental quality is then likely to turn all his attention towards consumption as
the minimum of his culture-weighted consumption compared to environmen-
tal quality is that what decides over his utility. Assume now that the agent
invests x > 0 into environmental culture, such that X(x) = 1. Then one
unit of consumption produces the same amount of utility as one unit of envi-
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ronmental quality. In other words, environmental quality becomes relatively
more important for utility than before.
3 The Model
In terms of motivation for the basic modeling structure we follow the convinc-
ing approach in John and Pecchenino (John and Pecchenino 1994). Thus, we
assume that society’s decisions are taken by a representative agent, who may
raise taxes to finance environmental maintenance (abatement) or to increase
environmental culture. This agent thus optimally allocates income towards
maintaning environmental quality, improving environmental culture, or in-
creasing savings for consumption when old.
Environmental quality
Environmental quality Et+1 represents the state of nature and is reduced
by emissions that come from consumption, ct, while it is increased through
abatement, at. The law of motion is given by
Et+1 = g(Et, ct) + γat, (1)
where ∂g(Et,ct)
∂Et
≥ 0, and ∂g(Et,ct)
∂ct
< 0. We interpret Et+1 as the state of nature
that the generation born at time t inherits. The coefficient γ > 0 on abate-
ment defines how effective a unit of abatement is in improving environmental
quality.
Environmental culture
We assume that environmental culture at time t is represented by Xt, in-
creased by investments xt through a production function ψ(xt) but depreci-
ates fully during the course of each generation. The production function is
assumed to have the following shape.
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A 1 Function ψ(xt) > 0, ψ
′(xt) > 0, ψ′′(xt) ≤ 0.
As a result, environmental culture is set according to
Xt+1 = ψ(xt). (2)
The assumption of full depreciation is justified based on the arguments in
the previous section.
The agent
We assume that in each period there exist two generations, a young one and
an old one. Each generation is represented by a single agent that lives for
two periods, called young in the first period of life and old in the second
period. We simplify by assuming away population growth. Young agents
receive a labor income wt ≥ 0. They may spend this income either on capital
formation st ≥ 0 for consumption ct when old, on abatement at ≥ 0 or
they may invest xt ≥ 0 in environmental culture. As old agents are not
altruistic with respect to future generations they use their returns on saving
for consumption only.
The utility function of the representative agent takes the form
u(Xt+1, ct+1, Et+1) = min{Xt+1ct+1, Et+1}. (3)
This specification, as explained in the previous section, rests on two as-
sumptions. One, environmental quality and effective consumption are perfect
complements. Two, the degree to which a unit of consumption is turned into
effective consumption depends on the agent’s investment in environmental
culture.8
The constraints faced by the agent are as follows. He receives wages
wt > 0 which he can allocate to savings st ≥ 0, to abatement at ≥ 0,
or to investing in environmental culture xt ≥ 0. Savings today receive an
8In this setup, it makes on difference whether we assume Xt = ψ(xt), or Xt+1 = ψ(xt).
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interest rate of Rt+1 > 1, and the agent fully consumes his savings plus the
interest obtained when old. In addition, he faces the law of motion for the
environment, as given by equation (1).
wt = st + xt + at, (4)
ct+1 = Rt+1st, (5)
Et+1 = g(Et, ct) + γat. (6)
We call the equilibrium resulting from the assumptions and conditions
above the temporal equilibrium. It is defined as follows.
Definition 1 The temporal equilibrium consists of the allocations {st, at, xt},
where at every t = 0, 1, 2, ..., the young generation maximizes (3) subject to
(4), (5) and (6), with wt, Et, Rt+1 and ct given.
Lemma 1 ∃xmt ≥ 0, such that xt = xmt solves
max
xt∈[0,wt]
ψ(xt)Rt+1(wt − xt).
Proof of Lemma 1 The derivative of function ψ(xt)Rt+1(wt − xt) with re-
spect to xt is ψ
′(xt)Rt+1(wt−xt)−ψ(xt)Rt+1 ≡ Θ(xt). This function has the
properties that Θ(0) = ψ′(0)Rt+1wt−ψ(0)Rt+1, while Θ(wt) = −ψ(wt)Rt+1 <
0, and Θ′(xt) = ψ′′(xt)Rt+1(wt − xt) − 2ψ′(xt)Rt+1 < 0. Consequently, an
interior solution requires wt > ψ(0)/ψ
′(0), in which case xt = xmt , where
xmt is the solution to Θ(x
m
t ) = 0. If wt ≤ ψ(0)/ψ′(0), then there exists no
interior solution to Θ(xmt ) = 0 and the optimal solution is x
m
t = 0. 
Thinking about the mathematical problem ex ante, then for interior
choices the optimal solution would be to find a combination between xt,
at and st such that
Et+1 = ψ(xt)ct+1. (7)
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Re-writing this equation by substituting the constraints (4), (5) as well as
the environmental law of motion (6) leads to
at =
ψ(xt)Rt+1(wt − xt)− g(Et, ct)
ψ(xt)Rt+1 + γ
. (8)
Here we have an equation of the two endogenous variables xt and at that also
implicitly determines st (via eq. (4)). We define
Γ(xt) ≡ Rt+1ψ(xt)(wt − xt) = Xt+1ct+1. (9)
Function Γ(xt) then represents the level of culturally-weighted consumption.
In other words, the environmental culture transforms one unit of consump-
tion in Xt+1 units of environment. Function Γ(xt) can then be understood
as potential, culture-weighted consumption. The interpretation of equation
(8) is that abatement is positive as long as the potential, culture-weighted
consumption level exceeds the given amount of environmental quality at the
time at which the agent takes his choices.
For a given environmental quality at time t, g(Et, ct), the agent will choose
the optimal mix of at, st and xt. Figure 1 illustrates how we can determine
the optimal allocations starting from equation (7), (8) and (9). Intuitively
speaking, an agent faced with a high level of environmental quality like gb
will be unable to increase his utility via investing in environmental quality
since the level of the environment is already relatively high. Therefore, he
will only maximize Γ(xt) = ψ(xt)Rt+1(wt− xt). By Lemma 1 this maximum
is given when xt = x
m
t . Since he takes his income and interest rate as given,
the maximization will simply be through xt ∈ [0, wt]. As the graph shows,
for any gt larger than or equal to Γ(x
m
t ), this point will be given by xt = x
m
t .
Clearly, xmt represents the optimal choice for xt when at = 0. Obviously, if
Γ′(xt) ≤ 0, ∀xt ∈ [0, wt], then xmt = 0. Hence, a positive amount xt will only
decrease overall utility since the costs of increasing environmental culture
outweigh the benefits. Or, in other words, the increase in environmental
15
Figure 1: Different optimal allocations
(a) Function Γ(xt) with corner and inte-
rior at
(b) Potential allocations of at as a re-
sponse to choices of xt
culture costs the agent too much consumption, so that overall the culture-
weighted consumption decreases. For Γ′(0) > 0, then the optimal xmt > 0.
In this case, investments in environmental culture increase culture-weighted
consumption.
In contrast, assume now that environmental quality at time t is low,
at e.g. ga. In this case keeping at = 0 would potentially waste income.
If Γ(xmt ) > g(Et, ct), then a positive amount of abatement would increase
utility. As the graph shows, the agent will have too much culture-weighted
consumption (relative to environmental quality) for all xt < xc, while too
little for all xt > xc. However, xc is not an optimal allocation either as the
agent can do better. He could invest less in environmental culture which
would increase Xt+1ct+1. The income saved can then be spent on abatement,
which increases Et+1 by γat, which is the direct effect of higher abatement
on environmental quality.
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3.1 Solving the model
We now solve the model analytically. The agent’s objective is to find the
combination of st, xt and at that leads to a maximum of utility given the
constraints and initial conditions. By relying on equation (7) and substitut-
ing the constraints, we can write
Et+1 =
Rt+1ψ(xt)
γ + ψ(xt)Rt+1
(
γ(wt − xt) + g(Et, ct)
)
. (10)
We use this as a new, reduced-form utility function,9 which we denote by
W (xt) =
ψ(xt)
γ + ψ(xt)Rt+1
(
γ(wt − xt) + g(Et, ct)
)
. (11)
The first-order condition10 of W (xt) with respect to xt gives
ψ′(xt) (γ(wt − xt) + g(Et, ct)) ≤ ψ(xt)
(
γ + ψ(xt)Rt+1
)
, (12)
which holds with equality if xt > 0. This condition states that, for interior
solutions, a marginal increase in xt will increase utility both through its effect
of the cultural weight on consumption and on environmental quality. The
right-hand side of equation (12) represents the marginal cost of the lower
savings valued at the interest rate Rt+1 and the cultural weight at which
consumption and the environment are traded-off. In addition, the marginal
cost of lower abatement at is given by γ and weighted by the environmental
culture.
9The term Rt+1 is equivalent to a monotone transformation, so we can neglect it.
10One can, equivalently, arrive at this result via maximizing ψ(xt)ct+1 subject to
ψ(xt)ct+1 = Et+1. When substituting the constraints one can then solve for at and
substitute this into ψ(xt)ct+1. This will lead to the same first-order condition as equation
(12) below.
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The second-order derivative is
W ′′(xt) =
(
ψ′′(xt)(γ(wt − xt) + gt)− 2γψ′(xt)
)
(γ + ψ(xt)Rt+1) (13)
−2γψ′(xt)2Rt+1(γ(wt − xt) + gt) < 0,
thus a maximum is assured.
We now define two bounds that are important for the latter analysis.
Definition 2 We define the thresholds
gL ≡ ψ(0)
ψ′(0)
(γ + ψ(0)Rt+1)− γwt,
and
gH ≡ ψ(wt)
ψ′(wt)
(γ + ψ(wt)Rt+1).
As we shall show later, given Assumption 1 it is always true that gL < gH .
Thus, gL denotes a lower bound, while gH defines an upper bound. We
introduce now the temporal equilibrium.
In Proposition 1 we introduce the optimal choices of the representative
agent given the maximization problem that we defined above.
Proposition 1 At the temporal equilibrium, the model as described in equa-
tions (3) to (6) gives rise to at maximum four different regimes that arise
depending on the following parameter conditions:
Regime 1. If g(Et, ct) ≤ gL ∧ g(Et, ct) < ψ(0)Rt+1wt, then there exists
a unique a∗1t =
ψ(0)Rt+1wt−g(Et,ct)
γ+ψ(0)Rt+1
, s∗1t = wt − a∗t , and x∗1t = 0.
Regime 2. If g(Et, ct) ≥ ψ(0)Rt+1wt ∧ wt ≤ ψ(0)/ψ′(0) , then a∗2t =
x∗2t = 0 and s
∗
2t = wt.
Regime 3. If g(Et, ct) ∈ (gL,Γ(xmt )) ∧ wt > ψ(0)/ψ′(0), then there exists
a unique x∗3t ∈ (0, wt) that solves equation (12), with a∗3t = Γ(x
∗
3t)−g(Et,ct)
γ+ψ(x∗3t)Rt+1
and
s∗3t = wt − a∗3t − x∗3t.
Regime 4. If Γ(xmt ) ≤ g(Et, ct) ∧ wt > ψ(0)/ψ′(0), then a4t = 0 and
s4t = wt − x4t, where x4t is given by x4t = xmt .
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Proof of Proposition 1 See Proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix 1.
The model here gives rise to a maximum of four different regimes. Which
regime turns out to be the optimal one for the society then depends on the
given economic and environmental conditions at the time of choice. For
low wealth levels, society is unable to free resources for environmental cul-
ture. Furthermore, if environmental quality is sufficiently high, then society
will find it optimal to simply direct all income towards savings and thus
maximizes consumption (Regime 2). This is a result of the strict lexiograph-
ical preference ordering. Based on the maxi-min choice criterion, a rela-
tively high level of environmental quality would make society waste income
if it is directed towards increasing environmental quality. Consequently, in-
come is spent on increasing the most needed component of utility, namely
culture-weighted consumption, a result akin to Maslow’s theory of needs.
This Regime 2 emphasizes the zero maintenance, minimum culture (tempo-
ral) equilibrium as a result of a low wealth and high environmental quality
combination.
In contrast, if environmental quality is relatively low and wealth is not
sufficiently high (Regime 1), then society should also target its wealth towards
investments in environmental quality. The choices undertaken by society
in this regime are then very close to those that are obtained via a utility
function that does not place so much emphasis on basic needs (c.f. John and
Pecchenino 1994).
When environmental quality and wealth are both sufficiently high, then
society may find it optimal to temporarily over-invest in environmental cul-
ture (Regime 4). This regime is characterized by an abundant environmental
quality and wealth. This is optimal until environmental quality is decreased
to a level from which onwards it is worthwhile for society to also invest in
environmental quality (Regime 3). In other words, if there is no urgent need
for society to improve environmental quality, then society will either invest
in an environmental culture if it can afford to do so, or not invest in case
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it is too poor. This result is related to the view of cultural ecology, as e.g.
defined in Berry (1975). In this line of literature, it is emphasized that the
environment at a given point in time determines both culture and behavior.
While we show this to be true at a given point in time, we also find that
environmental culture is able to affect future environmental quality. Thus,
there exist feedback loops between both the environment and culture.
We now look at some comparative statics assuming we are in Regime 3,
such that we have an interior solution to xt and at. In this case, changes in
the efficiency of maintenance lead to
dx∗3t
dγ
=
ψ(x∗3t)− ψ′(x∗3t)(wt − x∗3t)
Ω
> 0,
where Ω = ψ′′(x∗3t)(γ(wt − x∗3t) + gt)− 2ψ′(x∗3t)(γ + ψ′(x∗3t)Rt+1) < 0. Based
upon Lemma 1, it is easy to see that x∗3t < x
m
t , and therefore ψ(x
∗
3t) <
ψ′(x∗3t)(wt − x∗3t). The denominator is the second-order condition (13) of
the maximization problem (11) and is negative. Consequently, increases in
the efficiency of maintenance lead to increases in the optimal expenditure on
environmental culture.
In case the given level of environmental quality is larger, then investments
in environmental culture react according to
dx∗3t
dgt
= −ψ
′(x∗3t)
Ω
> 0.
Thus, for higher levels of environmental quality, and for lower consumption
levels of the previous generation, the current generation will profit from in-
creasing investments in environmental culture. This arises because a higher
given level of environmental quality allows to increase the agent’s indirect
utility. Consequently, the agent will raise culture-weighted consumption,
and one means to do so is via increases in environmental culture.
In addition, a wealthier agent will change his investments in environmen-
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tal culture according to
dx∗3t
dwt
= −γψ
′(x∗3t)
Ω
> 0.
Thus, he will increase environmental culture, and one reason is simply that
a higher wealth frees more of the agent’s income for investments in environ-
mental culture.
As a remark, in the extreme case of ψ(0) = 0, the lower bound gL will be
given by gL = 0. In this case, both Regimes 1 and 2 will not exist, and there
will always be an interior solution in xt. Consequently, only Regimes 3 and
4 apply. The existence of a corner solution in xt = 0, and therefore whether
or not society may optimally find itself in Regime 1 or 2, thus depends on
whether or not there is a minimal, positive amount of environmental culture
at each point in time.
We also note that the bounds identifying the four different regimes are
time-varying. They are an implicit function of the interest rate, the wages,
and, in the case of the bound Γ(x∗t ) which we obtained from the first-order
condition equation (12), also depend on the given environmental quality and
consumption. Consequently, the regions that make up the four regimes de-
pend on the level of economic development and the condition of the envi-
ronment. How these bounds evolve over time, therefore, depends on the
intergenerational structure of the model, which we now define.
3.2 The full model
In the previous section we derived the optimal decisions of a representative
agent for a given return on capital and for given wages. Consequently, we
could only analyze the effect of the agent’s choices for a given point in time.
We now extend the results in the previous section by assuming a law of
motion for capital. In doing so we can derive the evolution of our economy
over time and study its potential convergence to a steady state. In addition to
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introducing how capital accumulates, we also provide an explicit functional
for environmental quality and for the endogenous cultural weight, which will
facility the subsequent analysis at a minimal loss of generality.
A 1 Capital accumulation is given by st = kt+1.
Capital is assumed to depreciate fully within the course of one generation.
This assumption is borrowed from de la Croix and Michel (2002). It approx-
imately corresponds to estimates of the speed of capital depreciation during
one generation.
A 2 For all kt > 0, the production function takes the form f(kt) = k
α
t > 0,
α ∈ (0, 1).
We assume a representative firm that produces under constant returns to
scale with a production function satisfying the following assumptions. We
normalize Total Factor Productivity to one for simplicity. Based on this
explicit production function, the wage constraint and the law of motion for
capital accumulation, then the maximum feasible, constant level of capital is
given by kmax = (1− α) 11−α .11
A 3 For all xt > 0, the culture function assumes ψ(xt) = ψ0 + ψxxt > 0,
with ψ0 > 0 and ψx > 0.
The environmental culture function thus starts at the value ψ0 > 0, and
increases linearly with investments in environmental culture. For example,
a consumption-oriented society is likely to be characterized by a cultural
weight less than one. In this case, a unit of environmental quality would
be valued less than a unit of consumption. An investment in environmental
culture leads to a marginal increase by ψx > 0.
11In the subsequent analysis we shall concentrate on the case where kt ∈ [0, kmax],
although the results are also applicable outside of this domain for non-negative kt.
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A 4 For all Et+1 > 0, the environment evolves according to Et+1 = Et −
βct + γat. For Et − βct + γat ≤ 0, we assume the lower bound Et+1 = 0,
∀τ ≥ t.
where β > 0 denotes emissions per unit consumption and γ > 0 the effec-
tiveness of abatement. This thus implies that g(Et, ct) = Et − βct. On the
relevant time-scale of mankind, the own regeneration rate of the environment
is assumed to be negligible. Thus, in contrast to John and Pecchenino (1994),
environmental quality does not return to its natural level in case there is no
human interference. One could allow for a natural regeneration rate, as in e.g.
Jouvet et al. (2005). However, our focus is on studying whether investments
should be directed towards abatement or altruism, and therefore we want to
simplify the theoretical framework as much as possible and necessary. We
discuss the implication of this assumption in section 4.
A 5 We define η ≡ (1− α)γ − αβ and assume that η > 0.
This last assumption assures an interior solution to some cases. We return
to the implication of this assumption at a later stage.
We can now define the intertemporal equilibrium.
Definition 3 Given the capital stock k0 and the environmental quality E0,
an intertemporal equilibrium is a temporal equilibrium that furthermore sat-
isfies, for all t > 0, the capital accumulation condition kt+1 = st.
We now look at the four cases identified in Proposition 1 separately and
then combine the results together. Given our explicit functional forms as
well as Assumptions 2 to 5 we obtain the following explicit forms for the
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thresholds that we introduced above.
gL =
ψ0
ψx
(γ + ψ0αk
α−1
t+1 )− γ(1− α)kαt ,
gH =
ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kαt
ψx
(γ + (ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kαt )αkα−1t+1 ),
Γ(xmt ) = αk
α−1
t+1
(ψx(1− α)kαt + ψ0)2
4ψx
,
where threshold xmt is given by x
m
t =
ψx(1−α)kαt −ψ0
2ψx
. Γ(xmt ) is only defined
for (1 − α)kαt ≥ ψ0ψx , which implies kt ≥
[
ψ0
(1−α)ψx
]1/α
. We provide several
analytical conditions that help us in deriving the subsequent results.
Lemma 2 Given Assumptions 1 to 5 we find that gL > ψ(0)Rt+1wt iff wt >
ψ(0)/ψ′(0).
Proof of Lemma 2 Condition gL > ψ0Rt+1wt can easily be re-written as
(ψ(0)Rt+1 + γ)(ψ(0)/ψ
′(0)− wt) > 0 and thus holds iff wt < ψ(0)/ψ′(0). 
Lemma 3 Based on Assumptions 1 to 5 we obtain that Γ(xmt ) < gH .
Proof of Lemma 3 We substitute the explicit conditions into Γ(xmt ) < gH .
Then we rewrite and simplify αkα−1t+1
(ψx(1−α)kαt +ψ0)2
4ψx
<
ψ0+ψx(1−α)kαt
ψx
(γ + (ψ0 +
ψx(1− α)kαt )αkα−1t+1 ). This holds always. 
This Lemma is quite obvious in the sense that the maximum value of Γ(xt)
must be less than the upper threshold gH since the upper threshold is derived
for xt = wt.
Lemma 4 Given Assumptions 1 to 5 we find that Γ(xmt ) > ψ(0)Rt+1wt.
Proof of Lemma 4 Substituting the explicit functional forms into condi-
tion Γ(xmt ) > ψ(0)Rt+1wt and slightly simplifying gives (ψ0 +ψx(1−α)kαt )2 >
4ψ0ψx(1−α)kαt . Expanding the square term, simplifying and placing all terms
on one side gives ψ20 + ψ
2
x(1− α)2k2αt − 2ψ0ψx(1− α)kαt > 0. This can then
be re-written as (ψ0 − ψx(1− α)kαt )2 > 0, which holds always. 
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Combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 we obtain Γ(xm) ∈ (ψ(0)Rt+1wt, gH). As
Γ(xt) is maximized at xt = x
m
t , then Γ(x
∗) ≤ Γ(xm).
For matters of comparison, we also define a restricted model
Definition 4 The restricted model is given by equations (3) to (6) with
xt = 0, ∀t.
Thus, the restricted model is simply the original one introduced above where
the young generation cannot invest in environmental culture. As a result, in
this model we will always have that Xt+1 = ψ(0).
A direct implication of Lemma 4 is that, for a sufficiently high level of
environmental quality, environmental culture leads to earlier investments in
maintenance expenditure in comparison to the restricted model. Intuitively,
since investments in environmental culture raise the importance of environ-
mental quality for utility, then it becomes also more worthwhile for society
to invest in maintenance due to the positive feedback between culture and
the environment. The capital-environment combination in which environ-
mental culture leads to positive abatement expenditure in contrast to the
restricted model where no abatement expenditure is undertaken is given by
Γ(x∗3t) ∈ (ψ(0)Rt+1wt,Γ(xmt )). As a result, environmental culture has not
only a positive impact on environmental quality through lower levels of con-
sumption, but in addition it improves the environment through maintenance
expenditure for capital-environment combinations at which, without envi-
ronmental culture, no maintenance would be undertaken.
We are now in a position to study the dynamic evolution of the four
regimes that we identified above.
3.2.1 Regime 1
If g(Et, ct) ≤ gL ∧ g(Et, ct) < ψ(0)Rt+1wt, then there exists a unique a∗1t =
ψ(0)Rt+1wt−g(Et,ct)
γ+ψ(0)Rt+1
, s∗1t = wt − a∗t , and x∗1t = 0.
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This gives rise to the dynamic system
kt+1 =
Et + ηk
α
t
γ + ψ0αk
α−1
t+1
, (14)
Et+1 = ψ0αk
α−1
t+1
Et + ηk
α
t
γ + ψ0αk
α−1
t+1
. (15)
The steady state equations are given
E = ψ0αk
α ≡ z1(k), (16)
E = γk + (ψ0α− η)kα ≡ z2(k). (17)
The steady state in this regime can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 In Regime 1 the unique steady state is given by {k¯1, E¯1} =
{(η/γ) 11−α , αψ0 (η/γ)
α
1−α} and it is locally asymptotically stable. Convergence
to the steady state is monotonic.
Proof of Proposition 2 See Proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix.
At steady state {k¯1, E¯1}, condition gt ≤ gL implies k¯1 ≤ ψ0/ψx, which is
equivalent to the parameter condition (η/γ)
1
1−α ≤ ψ0/ψx, while condition
gt < ψ(0)Rt+1wt always holds.
12
Regime 1 occurs if the given environmental quality at the time that the
agent takes his decision is so low that investments in environmental culture
would not be able to increase utility. However, a positive level of abatement
would be worthwhile since an increase in environmental maintenance reduces
the gap between environmental quality and culture-weighted consumption.
This then leads to a convergence to a steady state without investments in
environmental culture, but a positive amount of environmental maintenance.
The economy will be caught in a low-culture trap, where abatement is un-
dertaken to safeguard a minimum level of environmental quality.
12We can also easily show that, if k¯1 exists, then k
max > k¯1. This applies since k
max =
(1− α) 11−α , and also k¯1 = (η/γ) 11−α .
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3.2.2 Regime 2
If g(Et, ct) ≥ ψ(0)Rt+1wt ∧ wt ≤ ψ(0)/ψ′(0), then a∗2t = x∗2t = 0 and s∗2t = wt.
We can easily show that gL ≥ ψ(0)Rt+1wt requires wt ≤ ψ(0)/ψ′(0).
In this case the dynamic system reduces to
kt+1 = (1− α)kαt , (18)
Et+1 = Et − αβkαt . (19)
Clearly, no steady state {E¯2, k¯2} exists in this case. The explicit solution to
the difference system (18) can be written as
kt = (1− α)
1
α
(∑t
τ=0
(1)τ a
τ
τ !
−1
)
kα
t
0 ≡ θ(k0, t), (20)
Et = E0 − αβ
t∑
τ=0
θ(k0, τ), (21)
with (1)τ being the Pochhammer symbol which denotes the falling factorial
(x)y = x(x+ 1)...(x+ y − 1) (see Abramowitz and Stegun 1972).
This Regime 2 emphasizes zero maintenance and no investment in en-
vironmental culture as a result of two sets of conditions that are working
together. The first set of conditions states that low wages with a too small
investment sensitivity of environmental cultural leads to a corner solution in
cultural investments. The second set of conditions states that investments
in environmental maintenance do not pay off since the given level of envi-
ronmental quality already exceeds effective consumption. With the laws of
motion for capital accumulation and environmental quality in mind, we then
see that environmental quality is only reduced (due to the zero maintenance),
while maximum effort is directed towards capital accumulation. As a result,
environmental quality is reduced at an increasing rate due to the growing
levels of consumption. Consequently, this Regime 2 does not lead to an
equilibrium. Instead, Regime 2 converges into either Regime 1 or Regime 4.
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It converges into Regime 4 if capital accumulates faster than environmental
quality is destroyed, which would, for example, be the case for a low emission
rate (low β) or a high share of capital in production (high α).
3.2.3 Regime 3
If g(Et, ct) ∈ (gL,Γ(xmt )) ∧ wt ≥ ψ(0)/ψ′(0), then there exists a unique
x∗3t ∈ (0, wt) that solves equation (12), with a∗3t = Γ(x
∗
3t)−g(Et,ct)
γ+ψ(x∗3t)Rt+1
and s∗3t =
wt − a∗3t − x∗3t.
The equations that are describing the dynamic system in this case are
given by
ηkαt + Et − γxt =
ψ0 + ψxxt
ψx
(
γ + (ψ0 + ψxxt)αk
α−1
t+1
)
, (22)
Et+1 = (ψ0 + ψxxt)αk
α
t+1, (23)
kt+1 = (1− α)kαt − xt − at, (24)
Et+1 = Et − αβkαt + γat. (25)
Equation (22) comes from the first-order condition (12), equation (23) is
equation (7) that derives directly from the maximin criterion, while equation
(24) is the capital accumulation equation and (25) the law of motion for
environmental quality. Solving equation (22) gives the interior solution13 for
xt by
x∗3t =
1
αψxk
α−1
t+1
[
− (γ + kα−1t+1 αψ0)
+
√
γ2 + αkα−1t+1 (γψ0 + Etψx + ψxηkαt )
]
, (26)
≡ ρ(Et, kt, kt+1). (27)
Condition gt > gL assures that x
∗
3 > 0. Then we use equations (24)
and (25) to substitute out at, (23) to substitute out Et+1, and substitute
the optimal solution x∗3t = ρ(Et, kt, kt+1). Thus, the system describing the
13We neglect the negative root.
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dynamic evolution of case 3 is given by
Et+1 = (ψ0 + ψxρ(Et, kt, kt+1))αk
α
t+1, (28)
ψ0αk
α
t+1 + γkt+1 = Et + ηk
α
t
−(ψxαkαt+1 + γ)ρ(Et, kt, kt+1). (29)
As shown above, condition gL < gH is always satisfied. Condition gt >
gL leads to (ψxkt+1 − ψ0)(ψ0αkα−1t+1 + γ) > ψx(ψxαkαt+1 + γ)ρ. A necessary
condition for gt > gL to hold is thus kt+1 > ψ0/ψx. The time-constant
versions of equations (28) and (29) are given14 by
E = γ
(
2k − ψ0
ψx
)
+ (αkψx − η)kα ≡ w1(k), (30)
E =
1
2
[
− 2γk + αkα+1ψx
+
√
k(k(αψxkα − 2γ)2 + 4αkα(γψ0 + ηψxkα))
]
≡ w2(k). (31)
The steady state is then obtained by combining the equations (22) to (25)
and is given by (
γ +
(
ψ0 + ψx
[
η
γ
kα − k
])
αkα−1
)
k
=
ψ0 + ψx
[
η
γk
α − k
]
ψx
(
γ +
(
ψ0 + ψx
[
η
γ
kα − k
])
αkα−1
)
. (32)
Proposition 3 There exists a unique steady state {k¯3, E¯3} to the dynamic
system (28) and (29) given by equation 2ψxk¯3 = ψ0 + ψx
η
γ
k¯α3 and E¯3 =
αk¯α+13 ψx, if k¯3 > ψ0/ψx. This steady state is locally asymptotically stable
and approached monotonically.
Proof of Proposition 3 See Proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix.
14For their derivation see Appendix 2.
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Regime 3 is the only regime that sees an interior solution in environmental
culture that actually converges to a steady state. In this regime, given en-
vironmental quality is sufficiently high so that investments in environmental
culture make sense. At the same time, it is not high enough in order to
induce a corner solution in maintenance. Or, in other words, the maximum
potential level of culture-weighted consumption exceeds the current level of
environmental quality, which gives some room for investments in environ-
mental quality. These positive investments in environmental quality help to
maintain a level of environmental quality at which it is worthwhile to also
invest in environmental culture.
3.2.4 Regime 4
If Γ(xmt ) ≤ g(Et, ct) ∧ wt > ψ(0)/ψ′(0), then a4t = 0 and s4t = wt − x4t,
where x4t is given by x4t = x
m
t .
Threshold xmt is given by x
m
t =
ψx(1−α)kαt −ψ0
2ψx
, leading to the dynamic
system
Et+1 = Et − αβkαt , (33)
kt+1 =
ψx(1− α)kαt + ψ0
2ψx
. (34)
This holds until either gt < Γ(x
m
t ) or ψx(1−α)kαt ≤ ψ0. If 1−α > (ψ0/ψx)1−α,
then kt+1 > (≤)kt for kt < (≥)ψ0+ψx(1−α)k
α
t
2ψx
. Consequently, for 1 − α ≥
(ψ0/ψx)
1−α, then the optimal solutions for kt and Et will move from Regime
4 to Regime 3 over time. Instead, if 1 − α < (ψ0/ψx)1−α, then kt and Et
converge either to Regime 3 or to Regime 2.We conclude that there exists no
steady state in Regime 4.
In Regime 4, environmental quality is so high that it does not pay off
to invest in maintenance. At the same time, income is sufficiently high for
agents to spend a part of it on investments in environmental culture. As a
result, environmental quality is diminished over time.
30
4 Discussion
From the analysis above it is clear that either the steady state in Regime 1
gets picked up, or the one of Regime 3. Which one will be asymptotically
approached depends on the parameter configurations. This is shown graphi-
cally in Figure 2 for two sets of generic parameter conditions. Under the first
set of parameters (α = 0.3, β = 1.5, γ = 2, ψ0 = 0.4, ψx = 1), the steady
state in Regime 1 gets selected, while under the second set of parameter con-
ditions (α = 0.3, β = 1, γ = 2.2, ψ0 = 0.4, ψx = 1), it is the steady state in
Regime 3 that is approached asymptotically. The analytical derivations for
the general shape of the regions is available in Appendix 2. We denote the
steady state curves of Regime 1 as E = z1(k) and E = z2(k), while those of
Regime 3 as E = w1(k) and E = w2(k). They are depicted as the dashed
lines in Figure 2. The boundaries of the four regions are defined according
to the conditions in Proposition 1 together with the explicit functional forms
and the law of motion for capital accumulation. Whether the dynamics in
Regime 4 converge necessarily to Regime 3 or whether they may also con-
verge to Regime 2 depends on whether condition 1−α ≥ (ψ0/ψx)1−α applies
or not. If it applies, then kt and Et converge from Regime 4 into Regime
3, otherwise they may also converge to Regime 2. The arrows depict the
dynamics for the case of 1− α ≥ (ψ0/ψx)1−α.
We now clarify the role of the endogenous environmental culture further.
Assume that the agent cannot invest in environmental culture. We are, thus,
in the case of the restricted model. This implies that the optimal decision for
abatement is
at =
ψ(0)Rt+1wt − g(Et, ct)
γ + ψ(0)Rt+1
,
if ψ(0)Rt+1wt > g(Et, ct), and at = 0 otherwise. Thus, in case the agent
cannot invest in environmental culture, we still recover Regime 1 and 2, but
these are not anymore constrained by the other two regimes. Using the
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Figure 2: Different optimal allocations
(a) Steady State in Region 1 (b) Steady State in Region 3
explicit functional forms, this choice for at then leads to the dynamic system
Et+1 = ψ0αk
α
t+1, (35)
kt+1 =
Et + ηk
α
t
γ + ψ0αk
α−1
t+1
. (36)
This dynamic system is exactly the same as the one arising in Regime 1, and
consequently the steady state and the dynamics are equivalent. As a result,
if the agent cannot invest in environmental culture, then he will necessarily
pick up the steady state in Regime 1. If the parameter combinations induce
the agent who may invest in environmental culture to also choose the steady
state in Regime 1, then both cases will lead to the same outcome. However,
the difference arises if the agent may freely invest in environment culture and
parameter combinations make him pick up the steady state in Regime 3. In
this case, the agent will invest in environmental culture, inducing a lower
steady state level of capital, but a higher steady state level of environmental
quality. This arises since the improvements in environmental culture raise
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culture-weighted consumption, which induces the agent to reduce savings in
favor of investments in environmental culture (and potentially abatement).
The reduction in savings leads to a lower steady state capital stock, but
also to less consumption and therefore higher steady state environmental
quality. We summarize this in the following proposition. We denote the
variables of the restricted model in which the young generation cannot invest
in environmental culture with a hat.
Proposition 4 If g(Eˆt, cˆt) < ψ(0)Rˆt+1wˆt, then aˆt =
ψ(0)Rˆt+1wˆt−g(Eˆt,cˆt)
γ+ψ(0)Rˆt+1
, and
sˆt = wˆt − aˆt.
• For g(Eˆt, cˆt) < ψ(0)Rˆt+1wˆt, then kˆ = k¯1 = (η/γ) 11−α , and Eˆ = E¯1 =
ψ0αk¯
α
1 .
• For g(Eˆt, cˆt) ≥ ψ(0)Rˆt+1wˆt, then kˆ > k¯1, and Eˆ < E¯1.
Proof of Proposition 4 The first part of proposition follows directly from
proof 1. The second part can be proven as follows. Define
B(k) = ψxη/γk
α + ψ0 − 2ψxk.
Since function B(k) is positive for k < k¯3 and negative for k > k¯3, then it
follows that kˆ > k¯3 if B(k¯) < 0. Substituting the solution for k¯ = (η/γ)
1
1−α
into B(k) and assuming that B(k) < 0 yields
B(kˆ) = ψxη/γ(η/γ)
α
1−α + ψ0 − 2ψx(η/γ) 11−α < 0.
Simplifying gives the condition ψ0/ψx < (η/γ)
1
1−α ≡ kˆ. At this parameter
configuration we know that Regime 3 applies, and consequently there is no
contradiction. Thus kˆ > k¯3.
Assume now that Eˆ < E¯3, thus
E¯3 = αψxk¯
1+α
3 > αψ0k¯
α.
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This implies k¯3 > (ψ0/ψx)
1
1+α (η/γ)
α
1−α2 ≡ k˜. If B(k˜) > 0, then k¯3 > k˜ and
consequently Eˆ < E¯3. Evaluating B(k˜) > 0 gives the condition
(ψ0/ψx)
α
1+α (η/γ)
1
1−α2 + ψ0/ψx − 2(ψ0/ψx) 11+α (η/γ)
α
1−α2 > 0.
This is equivalent to
kˆ
1
1+α + (ψ0/ψx)
1
1+α − 2(ψ0/ψx)
1−α
1+α kˆ
α
1+α > 0.
This condition holds if 1− 2(ψ0/ψx)
1−α
1+α kˆ
α−1
1+α , which can be re-written to kˆ >
2
1+α
1−αψ0/ψx. This holds always in Regime 3 since 2
1+α
1−α > 1 and kˆ>ψ0
ψx
. Thus,
we find that Eˆ < E¯3. 
Conclusively, by raising the importance of environmental quality for utility,
investments in environmental culture lead to lower levels of consumption and
higher environmental quality at steady state in comparison to the restricted
model.
What we, thus, find is that wealth drives utility through higher con-
sumption levels and the possibility to improve environmental quality through
maintenance, but after a certain level of economic development there are
other aspects that are raised into focus. In our case, the particular aspect
is environmental culture. A society that is rich enough will invest in both
culture and the environment, and thereby end up with a greater level of hap-
piness than one that is unable to invest in environmental culture. This result
suggests that, after a certain level of economic development, society may wish
to undergo a social change that places cultural aspects, here environmental
cultural aspects, at the forefront of decision-taking.
4.1 Robustness
In this section we study the robustness of the previous results. In particular,
we first look at the role of the depreciation rate in environmental culture,
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then we analyze the implication of allowing for a natural regeneration rate
in environmental quality, and finally we look at the role of technical changes.
4.1.1 Role of depreciation rate in environmental culture
One assumption in our model is that environmental culture depreciates fully
during the course of one generation. As a reminder, we assumed this since
each new generation is born void of any environmental culture and needs
to learn this culture through e.g. costly educational measures. However,
cultural attitudes may also be learned through means other than costly ed-
ucation. An environmental culture may also simply be transferred from the
parents to their children based on costless learning-by-doing, or simple adop-
tion of behavioral habits. There is, for example, a growing literature on
cultural learning, where the parents’ preference traits affect the preferences
of their children. In this regards, Graumann and Kruse (1990) find that at-
titudes are a social construct, implying that society plays a significant role
in shaping preferences. Dalhouse and Frideres (1996) conclude that children
tend to adopt the political position of their parents. Thus, if one assumes
that one’s political choices are driven by one’s preferences, then this naturally
leads one to accept that there is also an intergenerational transmission of en-
vironmental preferences. This intergenerational transmission of preferences
is studied and analysed in a series of articles by Bisin and Verdier (2001),
who emphasize the role of cultural dynamics and norms via social interac-
tions across generations. Schumacher (2009a) builds upon their work and
studies the effect of environmental quality on the intergenerational transmis-
sion of preferences. In an empirical study, Villacorta et al. (2003) conclude
that children’s environmental self-regulation is shaped by their parents’ en-
vironmental self-regulation. Thus, there is ample evidence suggesting that
an intergenerational transmission of preferences may take place.15
15The evidence does not necessarily imply that an intergenerational transmission of
preferences is costless. It could simply be that the intergenerational transmission facili-
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Furthermore, it may be that there are complements between existing
levels of environmental culture and e.g. educational expenditure in environ-
mental culture. In line with this literature, we assume that environmental
culture may depreciate at a rate δ ∈ (0, 1), but also interacts with environ-
mental educational investments, such that
Xt+1 = ψ((1− δ)Xt, xt).
Our assumption throughout the article was that δ = 1 and ψX = 0. In this
extension, we take it that dψ/dX > 0, and there is an upper bound to which
Xt tends for xt = (α
α
1−α − α 11−α )(1− α) 11−α and at = 0.16 Finally, X0 > 0.
Overall we observe that this does not modify the first-order condition, and
neither the conditions in Proposition 1. The only qualitative change may then
come from the dynamics of the model. Clearly, Regime 1 and 2 are unaltered,
since they have no investments in environmental culture. Regime 3 and 4 will
also see no qualitative changes to the dynamics themselves, only quantitative
ones. However, it may be possible to find a non-monotonic convergence
to the steady state in Regime 3. We leave this point for future research.
Conclusively, there are no important differences to the existence of the steady
states if one allows for less than full depreciation as well as feedbacks from
the stock of environmental culture to investments in environmental culture.
4.1.2 Implication of no regeneration rate
Some might view the assumption of no regeneration rate in environmental
quality as being too restrictive. We now relax this assumption and assume
tates the shaping of an environmental culture, e.g. through a higher marginal effect of
investments in environmental culture.
16In other words, we define this upper bound for the maximum sustainable amount that
an agent may invest in xt. This is given by k = (1− α)kα − x, solving for x, maximizing
this subject to k and substituting the optimal solution for k back into the solution for x.
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the law of motion as introduced in Jouvet et al. (2005). This is given by
Et+1 = mE˜ + (1−m)Et − βct + γat,
where m ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of convergence to the natural state E˜ > 0.
Clearly, for m = 0 we recover the functional form suggested in Assumption
4, while in the case of m = 1 there would be full convergence back to the
natural level during the course of each generation. Our focus is on whether
there are qualitative differences if one assumes m ∈ (0, 1) in comparison to
the case of m = 0 assumed above.
Based on the conditions identified in Proposition 1, there are only quan-
titative differences arising in the position of the four regions, since now
g(Et, ct) = mE˜ + (1 − m)Et − βct instead of g(Et, ct) = Et − βct. Regime
1 and 2 will stay qualitatively the same, and so will Regime 3. The only
qualitative difference is in Regime 4. A sufficiently high regeneration rate
will lead to the two dynamic equations
Et+1 = mE˜ + (1−m)Et − αβkαt , (37)
kt+1 =
ψx(1− α)kαt + ψ0
2ψx
. (38)
As a result, the unique steady state is defined by
E = E˜ − αβ
m
kα, (39)
2ψxk = ψx(1− α)kα + ψ0. (40)
Linearizing around the unique steady state shows that the steady state in
this case is asymptotically stable. However, this steady state exists only
if E˜ > αβ
m
kα. Thus, for a low natural level of the environment, or a suf-
ficiently slow regeneration rate, we find that our previous results continue
to hold qualitatively even in the case of a more general law of motion for
environmental quality.
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4.2 Improvements in technology
In this section we investigate changes in β, γ and ψx. The analytical deriva-
tions for these comparative statics are available in Appendix 3. Figures 3, 4
and 5 give the results graphically. The dashed lines are the new curves that
arise from a change in the parameter in question.
If β decreases, then this implies a more environmentally-friendly tech-
nology that leads to lower environmental damage from consumption. An
improvement in the technology that leads to fewer environmental spillovers
from consumption is shown in Figure 3. A decrease in β basically shifts all
region curves down. The steady state curves E = z2(k) and E = w2(k)
shift down, E = z1(k) stays constant while the slope of E = w1(k) in-
creases. This leads to an increase in environmental quality and capital stock
at steady state since the more efficient technology makes more wealth avail-
able that may be directed towards environmental culture or environmental
quality. Both Region 3 and 4 expand in size, implying that an interior solu-
tion to environmental culture is now more likely. In our example in Figure 3,
society was initially stuck in a low environmental culture equilibrium. The
improvement in environmentally-friendly technology leads to an interior solu-
tion in environmental culture, and consequently to a steady state in Region 3.
Thus, even small improvements in the environmental-friendliness of produc-
tion technologies may lead to enough wealth being freed up for investments
in environmental culture that then induces positive feedback loops over time,
where more environmental culture leads to more environmental quality which
in turn induces another generation to invest more in environmental culture.
One remark may be in order here. If the production technology becomes
more environmentally-friendly at time t, then this will have no impact on
the decisions of the young generation at time t, since β affects a generation’s
choices only through the level of consumption. Consequently, a change in
production technology at time t will only impact the decisions of the young
generation at time t + 1. This, furthermore, implies that, in this model of
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Figure 3: Changes in β
intergenerational spillovers, there are no incentives for the young generation
at time t to make the production technology more environmentally-friendly.
Only a policy maker who, at minimum, maximizes over two periods, will
have an incentive to finance improvements in the consumption spillover on
environmental quality. This result indicates that e.g. costly R&D expendi-
ture may not be undertaken in case society’s benefit is only in the distant
future, and therefore society may never be able to free enough wealth to get
out of the low environmental culture and environmental quality equilibrium.
An increase in γ implies a more efficient abatement technology. This is
depicted in Figure 4. The only region curve that shifts is gt = gL which
separates Region 1 and 3. Just like in the case for decreases in β, an increase
in γ shifts the steady state curves E = z2(k) and E = w2(k) down, E = z1(k)
stays constant while the slope of E = w1(k) increases. Thus, an improvement
in the maintenance technology makes a given amount of abatement more
efficient in improving environmental quality. In Figure 4, the improvement in
abatement technology leads to an interior solution in environmental culture,
and consequently to a steady state in Region 3. The fundamental difference
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Figure 4: Changes in γ
between improvements in emissions per unit of consumption (i.e. reductions
in β) and improvements in abatement technology (i.e. increases in γ) is that
changes in β have an impact on the given level of environmental quality
g(Et, ct). This diminishes the need to improve environmental quality via
maintenance, thus shrinking region 1. The increase in given environmental
quality makes investments in environmental culture more profitable, thus
expanding Region 3 and 4. Improvements in the effectiveness of maintenance
only impact the trade-off between investments in environmental culture and
abatement. Consequently, a better maintenance technology allows to direct
more wealth towards environmental culture. This results in a shrinking of
Region 1 and an expansion of Region 3. In contrast to changes in β, costly
R&D expenditure that affects γ may be worthwhile to undertake for a young
generation since changes in the effectiveness of abatement expenditure today
impact environmental quality when old and thus affect the young generation’s
choices already today.
Finally, an improvement in ψx implies a more efficient learning process
in environmental culture. Consequently, the regions 3 and 4 in which invest-
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Figure 5: Changes in ψx
ments in environmental culture are worthwhile to undertake expand. While
the steady state curves E = z1(k) and E = z2(k) remain unchanged, the
slopes of both E = w1(k) and E = w2(k) become steeper. Thus, at steady
state the agent gives up some consumption in order to achieve a higher level
of environmental quality at steady state. Thus, the agent raises both invest-
ments in environmental culture and in maintenance.
We can observe that in all three cases (changes in β, γ or ψx) it is possible
that technological improvements lead to shift from an equilibrium without
environmental culture, low environmental quality and low wealth, to one
with environmental culture, higher environmental quality and higher wealth.
Thus, the technological improvements studied here have the potential to lead
to an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). An EKC arises if the relation-
ship between economic development and environmental quality is inversely
u-shaped. For example, let us assume that environmental quality was high
but wealth was low. Let us furthermore take it that the parameter condi-
tions lead society to eventually pick up the steady state in Regime 1. In this
case, society will find itself in Regime 2, and it will increase wealth at the
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expense of environmental quality. When environmental quality is run down
to a sufficiently low level, then society will start to invest in maintenance,
and we observe a convergence to a medium level of wealth but a low level of
environmental quality. Assume now that there is a sufficiently large techno-
logical advance in how consumption leads to pollution, or in the effectiveness
of abatement, or in education. In this case, society may start to invest in
environmental culture, leading to higher levels of environmental quality and
a further economic development. Thus, an EKC may arise in this model, but
it requires sufficiently large technological improvements that make society
pick up the steady state in Regime 3 rather than the one in Regime 1.
5 Conclusion
In this article we study the role of an endogenous environmental culture in
an overlapping generation model with Leontieff preferences. Both an endoge-
nous environmental culture as well as Leontieff preferences have seen little
emphasis in the environmental economics literature. However, culture has
been emphasized time and again as one of the important pillars of sustainable
development, while the Leontieff preferences are believed to be an empirical
regularity.
Our main findings are that for low wealth levels, society is unable to free
resources for environmental culture. In this case, society will only invest in
environmental maintenance if environmental quality is sufficiently low. Once
society has reached a certain level of economic development, then it may
optimally invest a part of its wealth in developing an environmental culture.
When environmental quality and wealth are both sufficiently high, then soci-
ety may find it optimal to temporarily over-invest in environmental culture.
This is optimal until environmental quality is decreased to a level from which
onwards it is worthwhile for society to also invest in environmental quality.
In other words, if there is no urgent need for society to improve environmen-
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tal quality, then society will either invest in an environmental culture if it can
afford to do so, or not invest in case it is too poor. Technological improve-
ments in emission or abatement efficiency both raise steady state wealth and
environmental quality.
Our model suggests that, by raising the importance of environmental
quality for utility, environmental culture leads to lower levels of consump-
tion and higher investments in maintenance in contrast to a restricted model
where no investments in environmental culture are possible. It, furthermore,
leads to societies with lower steady state levels of wealth but higher steady
state levels of environmental quality. Furthermore, since investments in en-
vironmental culture raise the importance of environmental quality for utility,
it becomes also more worthwhile for society to invest in maintenance due
to the positive feedback between culture and the environment. As a re-
sult, environmental culture has not only a positive impact on environmental
quality through lower levels of consumption, but in addition it improves the
environment through maintenance expenditure for wealth-environment com-
binations at which, without environmental culture, no maintenance would
be undertaken.
This analysis suggest that wealth drives happiness (utility) through higher
consumption levels and the possibility to improve environmental quality
through maintenance, but after a certain level of economic development there
are other aspects that are raised into focus. In our case, the particular aspect
we looked at is environmental culture. A society that is rich enough will in-
vest in both culture and the environment, and thereby end up with a greater
level of happiness than one that is unable to invest in environmental culture.
This result suggests that, after a certain level of economic development, so-
ciety may wish to undergo a social change that places cultural aspects, here
environmental cultural aspects, at the forefront of decision-taking.
In terms of future research, one suggestion would be to add to this anal-
ysis the last type of capital that we neglected here, namely human capital
43
(Becker 2009). One could then study the model within an endogenous growth
setting and analyze further the interaction between the different types of
capital along the path of economic development. Another extension could
place this analysis within the literature of the Environmental Kuznets Curve
(EKC). The idea would be to see under what circumstances environmental
culture may drive a u-shaped relationship between the stages of economic
development and environmental quality. For example, within this model an
EKC will arise if society starts with a high environmental quality and low
wealth combination, which leads to economic development at the expense of
environmental quality and convergence to a steady state without environ-
mental culture but some maintenance expenditure. If society then receives a
windfall increase in capital (e.g. international capital inflows, remittances),
or sufficiently large technological improvement in either the effectiveness of
abatement or in the consumption-to-pollution spillover, then society may in-
vest environmental culture, leading to higher levels of environmental quality
and a further economic development. Thus, an EKC may arise in this model,
but it requires technological improvements or windfall increases in wealth.
As a result, what would be interesting would be to study a framework with
endogenous technological changes or international capital markets.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1 Given the maximization problem as defined by eq.
(3) to (6), we denote an optimal, regime-dependent solution by x∗it, a
∗
it and
s∗it, for i = 1, ..., 4. Substituting the constraints into Et+1 = ψ(xt)ct+1 gives
the reduced-form utility function, which we denote by
W (xt) =
ψ(xt)
γ + ψ(xt)Rt+1
(
γ(wt − xt) + g(Et, ct)
)
, (41)
where the choice variable is xt, which implicitly determines a
∗
it and s
∗
it. Max-
imizing function W (xt) subject to xt gives rise to the first-order condition in
eq. (12). The second-order condition is given by equation (13). It is negative
and thus assures a maximum.
We define A(x) ≡ ψ′(xt)
(
γ(wt − xt) + g(Et, ct)
)
and B(x) ≡ ψ(xt)
(
γ +
ψ(xt)Rt+1
)
. These have the properties that A(0) = ψ′(0)
(
γwt+g(Et, ct)
)
> 0,
while A(wt) = ψ
′(wt)g(Et, ct) > 0, with A′(xt) = ψ′′(xt)
(
γ(wt − xt) +
g(Et, ct)
) − ψ′(xt)γ < 0. In contrast, B(0) = ψ(0)(γ + ψ(0)Rt+1) > 0,
B(wt) = ψ(wt)
(
γ +ψ(wt)
)
> 0 with B(wt) > B(0), and B
′(xt) = ψ′(xt)
(
γ +
2ψ(xt)
)
> 0.
Thus, there exists a unique solution to eq. (12) if A(0) > B(0) and
B(wt) > A(wt). Condition A(0) > B(0) can be re-written as
g(Et, ct) >
ψ(0)
ψ′(0)
(γ + ψ(0)Rt+1)− γwt ≡ gL,
while A(wt) < B(wt) leads to
g(Et, ct) <
ψ(wt)
ψ′(wt)
(γ + ψ(wt)Rt+1) ≡ gH .
There exists a g(Et, ct) such that g(Et, ct) ∈ (gL, gH) since gL < gH holds
always if Assumption 1 applies.
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Solving eq. (12) for xt gives the solution xt = x
∗
3t. Substituting this x
∗
3t
into eq. (8) then leads to the following conditions. If Γ(x∗3t) > g(Et, ct) then
a∗3t =
Γ(x∗3t)−g(Et,ct)
ψ(x∗3t)Rt+1+γ
, with s∗3t = wt − a∗3t − x∗3t (Regime 3).
If g(Et, ct) ∈ (gL, gH) and Γ(x∗3t) ≤ g(Et, ct) then a∗4t = 0 and s∗4t =
w−x∗4t. Since Γ(x∗3t) is also implicitly a function of g(Et, ct), then we need to
know the position of Γ(x∗3t) relative to Γ(x
m
t ) and gH when Γ(x
∗
3t) ≤ g(Et, ct).
This we do as follows. We take the first-order condition eq (12) and set
g(Et, ct) = Γ(x
∗
3t). This gives us
ψ′(x∗3t)
(
γ(wt − x∗3t) + ψ(x∗3t)Rt+1(wt − x∗3t)
)
= ψ(x∗3t)
(
γ + ψ(x3t∗)Rt+1
)
.
Simplifying leads to ψ′(x∗3t)(wt − x∗3t) = ψ(x∗3t). This only holds if x∗3t = xmt .
There exist two sub-cases which are based on Lemma 1. An interior solution
to ψ′(x∗3t)(wt − x∗3t) = ψ(x∗3t) requires wt > ψ(0)/ψ′(0), and we denote the
optimal solution in this case as x∗4t = x
m
t . Thus, for Γ(x
∗
3t) ≤ g(Et, ct) and
wt > ψ(0)/ψ
′(0) we have that x∗4t = x
m
t (Regime 4). If wt ≤ ψ(0)/ψ′(0),
then there exists no interior solution to ψ′(x∗3t)(wt − x∗3t) = ψ(x∗3t) and the
optimal x∗t will be equal to zero. We denote this as x
∗
2t (Regime 2).
For A(0) ≤ B(0), then this implies g(Et, ct) ≤ gL. Hence, W ′(xt) < 0,
∀xt ≤ wt, and thus x∗t = 0 and a∗t ≥ 0, where a∗t solves eq. (8) with x∗t = 0 and
s∗t = w−a∗t . If g(Et, ct) < ψ(0)Rt+1wt then from eq. (8) at x∗1t = 0 we obtain
a∗1t =
ψ(0)Rt+1wt−g(Et,ct)
γ+ψ(0)Rt+1
(Regime 1), while a∗2t = 0 if g(Et, ct) ≥ ψ(0)Rt+1wt
(Regime 2). 
Proof of Proposition 2 The steady state of this system can easily be cal-
culated by solving the dynamic system (14) and (15) for their fixed points k
and E. We denote the steady state values of kt and Et in regime 1 by k¯1 and
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E¯1. Solving for these gives the two steady states
k¯1 =
(
η
γ
) 1
1−α
, (42)
E¯1 = αψ0
(
η
γ
) α
1−α
. (43)
For stability we linearize system (14) and (15) around the unique steady state
and obtain the system[
Et+1
kt+1
]
=
[
E¯1
k¯1
]
+
[
α2ψ0
η+α2ψ0
α3γψ0
η+α2ψ0
η
γ(η+α2ψ0)
αη
η+α2ψ0
][
Et − E¯1
kt − k¯1
]
,
From this we obtain the characteristic polynomial
λ21 −
α(η + αψ0)
η + α2ψ0
λ1 = 0 (44)
This gives rise to the eigenvalues λ1a = 0 and λ1b =
α(η+αψ0)
η+α2ψ0
. It is
then straight-forward to see that λ1b ∈ (0, 1), which implies a monotonic
convergence to the steady state. 
Proof of Proposition 3 First we show that gL < gH . Combining and re-
placing the explicit functional forms gives, after simplification, −α(2ψ0kα−1+
ψx(1− α)k2α−1) < 2γ. This thus holds at any interior k.
We then look at equation (32). If
(
ψ0 + ψx
[
η
γ
kα − k
])
αkα−1 6= −γ, then
the equation describing the steady state is given by
ψxk = ψ0 + ψx
[
η
γ
kα − k
]
. (45)
If instead equation (45) does not hold, then the steady state equation is defined
by
α
(
ψ0 + ψx
[
η
γ
kα − k
])
= −γk1−α. (46)
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A third possibility is that both equations (45) and (46) hold with equality. This
is the easiest to dismiss since combining both equations leads to αψxk
α = −γ
which is impossible. We now need to study whether the two potential steady
states exist within the bounds given by Proposition 1. For equation (46) it
is easy to show that g > gL never holds. Substituting equation (46) into the
threshold condition gt > gL gives, after some simplifications,
ηkα − γk > ψ0
ψx
(
γ + ψ0αk
α−1) .
The right-hand side is positive, while the left-hand side is negative at the
steady state described by equation (46). Thus, the solution for k given by
equation (46) will not define a steady state for case 3.
For equation (45) we can show that g < gH if k > ψ0/ψx. Assuming
g < gH requires (
ψ0 + ψx
[
η
γ
kα − k
])
αkα − αβkα < (47)
ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kα
ψx
(
γ + (ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kα)αkα−1
)
. (48)
We then collect terms and slightly rewrite to get
(ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kα)(ψxαkα−1 − γk − (ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kα)αkα) < −Ψ,
where Ψ ≡ −ψ2x(αβ/γkα − k)αkα − ψxαβkα < 0. Dividing through by the
positive term (ψ0 +ψx(1−α)kα) and substituting equation (45) for kα, mul-
tiplying by η(> 0) leads to
ψxαηk
α+1 − ηγk − ψ0αηkα − α(1− α)γ(2ψxk − ψ0)kα < Ψ˜k,
where Ψ˜ = η
ψ0+ψx(1−α)kαΨ. Collecting terms and simplifying gives
−αβ(ψxk − ψ0)kα − ηk − α(1− α)γψxkα+1 < Ψ˜k.
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A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is k > ψ0/ψx. Finally, we
derive the condition under which equation (45) implies g > gL. Assuming
g > gL and substituting equation (45) gives
ψxαk
α+1 >
ψ0
ψx
(γ + ψ0αk
α−1)− ηkα.
Slightly rewriting gives us
η + ψxαk >
ψ0
ψx
(γk−α + ψ0αk−1).
Substituting equation (45) again gives
ηψxk
(
2
ψxk − ψ0
2ψxk − ψ0
)
+ ψ2xαk
2 > ψ20α.
Clearly, if k > ψ0/ψx, then this inequality is satisfied. If k ∈
[
ψ0
2ψx
, ψ0
ψx
)
, then
g < gL. Finally, define Ω(k) ≡ ηk
(
2 ψxk−ψ0
2ψxk−ψ0
)
+ ψ2xαk
2. Then it is easy to
show that Ω′(k) > 0 if k < ψ0
2ψx
. Thus, we conclude that g < gL, ∀k < ψ0/ψx.
For stability, we proceed as follows. We linearize system (28) and (29)
around the unique steady state to obtain the system[
Et+1
kt+1
]
=
[
E
k
]
+DH(E, k)
[
Et − E
kt − k
]
,
where matrix DH(E, k) takes the form
DH(E, k) =
[
H11 H12
H21 H22
]
.
The individual elements of matrix DH(E, k) are given by
H11 =
kαα(1 + α)ψx
2γ + kαα(1 + α)ψx
,
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H12 =
k−1+2αα2(1 + α)γψx(η − α(ψ0 − 2kψx))
(γ + kααψx) (2γ + kαα(1 + α)ψx)
,
H21 =
1
2γ + kαα(1 + α)ψx
,
H22 =
αη
k (2k−αγ + α(1 + α)ψx)
.
From this we obtain the characteristic polynomial
λ2 − α(η + kψx + αkψx)
k (2k−αγ + α(1 + α)ψx)
λ = 0 (49)
This gives rise to the eigenvalues λ1 = 0 and λ2 =
α(η+kψx+αkψx)
k
(
α(1+α)ψx+
2ηψx
2kψx−ψ0
) .
Then λ2 < 1 implies ψ0−2kψx < 2η, which holds under Assumption 5 and iff
k > ψ0/ψx; and λ2 > −1 implies αη > −2kψx
(
α(1− α) + η
2kψx−ψ0
)
. Again,
this holds if k > ψ0/ψx and under Assumption 5. Finally, it is easy to see
that λ2 > 0. Thus, there are no cycles and convergence to the steady state is
monotonic. 
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Appendix 2
Derivation of the figures in section 4
Here we derive the shape of the four different regions that depend on the
analytical thresholds. As a reminder, those thresholds are
gL =
ψ0
ψx
(γ + ψ0αk
α−1
t+1 )− γ(1− α)kαt ,
gH =
ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kαt
ψx
(γ + (ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kαt )αkα−1t+1 ),
Γ(xmt ) = αk
α−1
t+1
(ψx(1− α)kαt + ψ0)2
4ψx
.
Γ(xmt ) is only defined for (1− α)kαt ≥ ψ0ψx .
The conditions that are separating the four regions are then as follows.17
Separating Regime 1 and Regime 3 is gt = gL, which becomes
Et =
ψ0
ψx
(γ + ψ0αk
α−1
t+1 )− ηkαt . (50)
In the limit to this point we know that equation (14) holds
kt+1 =
Et + ηk
α
t
γ + ψ0αk
α−1
t+1
.
Substituting the equation above into (50) and solving for kt+1 gives kt+1 =
ψ0/ψx. Substituting this solution into the equation above yields
Et =
ψ0
ψx
(γ + ψ0α(ψ0/ψx)
α−1)− ηkαt .
By the constraints for Regime 3, this equation starts from wt = ψ0/ψx, which
17Here we remind the reader that the subsequent solutions only apply to separate the
regimes in question, and do not hold for regions in which other regimes may apply.
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implies
Et = αψ0(ψ0/ψx)
α +
αβ
1− αψ0/ψx,
while its slope is given by
dEt
dkt
= −αηkα−1t < 0,
and its second derivative is
d1Et
dk1t
= α(1− α)ηkα−2t > 0,
It cuts Et = 0 at
kt =
[
ψ0
ηψx
(γ + ψ0α(ψ0/ψx)
α−1)
] 1
α
.
Regime 3 and 4 are separated by the condition gt = Γ(x
m
t ). Substituting
the explicit solutions and the dynamic equation for capital in Regime 4, we
can re-write this as
Et = αβk
α
t +
α
2α+1ψαx
[
ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kαt
]α+1
.
By the constaints for Regime 3 and 4, this equation starts at wt = ψ0/ψx,
giving
Et = αψ0(ψ0/ψx)
α +
αβ
1− αψ0/ψx,
which is equivalent to the starting point of gt = gL that separates Regime 1
and 3. Its slope is given by
dEt
dkt
= α2βkα−1t +
α2(1− α2)
2α+1ψα−1x
[
ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kαt
]α
kα−1t > 0.
The condition that separates Regime 1 and 2 is gt = ψ0Rt+1wt, which, when
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combined with the capital equation for Regime 2, yields
Et = αβk
α
t + αψ0(1− α)αkα
2
t .
For kt = 0 we obtain Et = 0, while the derivative is
dEt
dkt
= α2βkα−1t + α
3ψ0(1− α)αkα2−1t > 0,
and the second derivative is
d2Et
dk2t
= −(1− α)α2βkα−2t − α3ψ0(1− α)α(1− α2)kα
2−2
t < 0.
By the constraints for Regime 1 and 2, this function reaches its maximum at
wt = ψ0/ψx, which gives
Et = αψ0(ψ0/ψx)
α +
αβ
1− αψ0/ψx,
which again is the same point as for the other constraints. Finally, Regime
2 and 4 are separated by the vertical line wt = ψ0/ψx.
We can derive the steady state curves as follows. For Regime 1 they will
be given by the time-constant versions of the equations (14) and (15), which,
after solving for E, are respectively given by
E = ψ0αηk
α ≡ z1(k), (51)
E = γk + (ψ0α− η)kα ≡ z2(k). (52)
Then the shape of z1(k) is z1(0) = 0, z
′
1(k) > 0 and z
′′
1 (k) < 0. The shape of
z2(k) is z2(0) = 0, z
′
2(0) < (>)0 if αψ0 < (>)η. If αψ0 < η then z
′
2(k) > 0
for k >
[
α(η−αψ0)
γ
] 1
1−α .
The steady state curves of Regime 3 are the time-constant versions of
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equations (28) and (29), which are respectively given by
E = (ψ0 + ψxρ)αk
α, (53)
ψ0αk
α + γk = E + ηkα − (ψxαkα + γ)ρ, (54)
with
ρ =
1
αψxkα−1
[
− (γ + kα−1αψ0)+√γ2 + αkα−1 (γψ0 + Eψx + ψxηkα)].
Substituting and solving for E yields the following two steady state equations
E = γ
(
2k − ψ0
ψx
)
+ (αkψx − η)kα ≡ w1(k), (55)
E =
1
2
[
− 2γk + αkα+1ψx
+
√
k(k(αψxkα − 2γ)2 + 4αkα(γψ0 + ηψxkα))
]
≡ w2(k). (56)
We can then derive the shape of these steady state curves as follows. We
obtain w2(0) = 0, with
w′2(k) =
1
2
(
− 2γ + α(1 + α)kαψx
+
4γ2k + αk2αψx((2 + 4α)η + α(1 + α)kψx) + 2αγk
α((1 + α)ψ0 − (2 + α)kψx)√
k
(
k (−2γ + αkαψx)2 + 4αkα (γψ0 + ηkαψx)
) ),
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and
w′′2(k) =
1
2
(
α2(1 + α)k−1+αψx
−
(
4γ2k + αk2αψx((2 + 4α)η + α(1 + α)kψx) + 2αγk
α((1 + α)ψ0 − (2 + α)kψx)
)2(
k
(
k (−2γ + αkαψx)2 + 4αkα (γψ0 + ηkαψx)
))3/2
+
4γ2k + α2(1 + 2α)k2αψx(4η + (1 + α)kψx) + 2α(1 + α)γk
α(αψ0 − (2 + α)kψx)
k
√
k
(
k (−2γ + αkαψx)2 + 4αkα (γψ0 + ηkαψx)
) ).
Calculations for w1(k) give
w′1(k) = 2γ − αηkα−1 + (1 + α)αψxkα,
which is negative for small capital (w1(0) = −γψ0/ψx < 0) and positive for
sufficiently large capital,
w′′1(k) = (1− α)αηkα−2 + α2(1 + α)ψxkα−1 > 0.
Thus, w1(k) is a convex function, that starts from zero, turns negative and
then positive.
We now prove that w1(k) is the continuation of z1(k) while w2(k) starts
where z2(k) ends. We re-write the condition g = gL to
αkα−1 =
1
ψ20
[
ψx(E + ηk
α)− γψ0
]
,
and substitute this into the time-constant solution for ρ. This gives
ρ =
1
αψxkα−1
[
− γ − αψα−10 +
ψx
ψ0
(E + ηkα)
]
.
Re-writing g = gL again gives us E−ηkα = ψ0ψx (γ+ψ0αkα−1), and substituting
this one into the equation for ρ above yields ρ = 0. Thus, at g = gL we have
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ρ = 0. Consequently, we know that at g = gL we have
E = ψ0αk
α, (57)
E = ψ0αk
α + γk − ηkα. (58)
The first equation is equivalent to z1(k), while the second one is the same as
z2(k). Thus, both sets of equations meet at g = gL.
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Appendix 3
Derivation of results in section 4.2
Here we derive the comparative statics of the conditions that separate
the four regimes, where we look at changes in β, γ and ψx. As a reminder,
η = (1− α)γ − αβ.
We obtained that gt = gL implies
Et =
ψ0
ψx
(γ + ψ0α(ψ0/ψx)
α−1)− ηkαt .
Thus, comparative statics lead to
dEt
dβ
= αkαt > 0, (59)
dEt
dγ
=
ψ0
ψx
− (1− α)kαt < 0, (60)
dEt
dψx
= −γψ0
ψx
− α2
(
ψ0
ψx
)α+1
< 0. (61)
Then, gt = Γ(x
m
t ) leads to
Et = αβk
α
t +
α
2α+1ψαx
[
ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kαt
]α+1
.
In this case, comparative statics imply
dEt
dβ
= αkαt > 0, (62)
dEt
dγ
= 0, (63)
dEt
dψx
=
αψα+1x (ψ0 + ψx(1− α)kαt )(ψx(1− α)kαt − αψ0)
2α+1 > 0.
(64)
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Also, gt = ψ0Rt+1wt yields
Et = αβk
α
t + αψ0(1− α)αkα
2
t .
The comparative statics in this case give
dEt
dβ
= αkαt > 0, (65)
dEt
dγ
= 0, (66)
dEt
dψx
= 0. (67)
Finally, wt = ψ0/ψx gives
(1− α)kαt = ψ0/ψx.
Consequently, there is no change in Et when β or γ change, but for changes in
ψx this vertical threshold shifts to the left as given by
dkt
dψx
= − 1
α
(
ψ0
1−α
)1/α
ψ
− 1−α
α
x <
0.
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